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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

HILDE B. MONTGOMERY
(SNITCHLER),
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 920138-CA

vs.

Priority 16

ROBERT G. MONTGOMERY,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has
jurisdiction to review all final judgments and orders
of the District Court involving domestic relations
cases pursuant to Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
THE COURT CORRECTLY MODIFIED THE STIPULATION
WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES
REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S ENTITLEMENT TO DEFENDANT'S
RETIREMENT BENEFITS.
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A Stipulation based on inaccurate information or
misrepresentation can be set aside.
787 P.2d 1344 (Utah App. 1990).

Gates v. Gates,

As long as the Court

has made adequate factual findings, they should not be
disturbed unless clearly erroneous, against the clear
weight of evidence or the appellate Court determines
that there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of
the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error.
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990) and
Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 479 (Utah App.
1988) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from an order granting

plaintiffs Petition for Modification regarding her
entitlement to defendant's retirement benefits of the
Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of
Utah.
II.

Course of Proceedings.
The parties were divorced on November 6, 1985.

Pursuant to the terms of the Decree of Divorce, the
plaintiff was awarded a one-half interest in the
defendant's retirement with the appropriate offset for
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his share of her retirement, all based on the formula
set forth in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (1982).
Shortly after the divorce, the parties entered
into a Stipulation modifying the Decree, wherein they
agreed that after the Woodward formula was applied to
the parties' respective retirements, the plaintiff
would be entitled to receive $400,00 per month from the
defendant's retirement which would begin concurrently
with the defendant's civil service retirement.
On November 2, 1990, the parties entered into a
new Stipulation wherein the plaintiff agreed that she
would settle her full claims against the defendant's
retirement by having the retirement office pay her the
lump sum of $8,100.00 during the same time the
defendant received the remaining portion of his lump
sum entitlement.
On August 13, 1991, the plaintiff filed her
Petition for Modification.

A trial was held

January 8, 1992, at which time the Court announced its
decision from the bench.

Specific Findings of Fact and

Order were subsequently prepared and signed by the
Court on February 6, 1992.

They are attached as an

Addendum to this Brief.
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III.

Disposition at Trial Court.
The Court found that the defendant had

misrepresented to the plaintiff what the retirement
benefits were and never conveyed to her what her actual
entitlement was or could be, and that misrepresentation
caused the plaintiff to enter into the Stipulation
dated November 2, 1990.

Accordingly, the Court set

aside that Stipulation and entered a new Order which
closely approximated that which had been granted to the
plaintiff at the time of the original divorce.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married on June 13, 1964.
result of the marriage, two children were born.

As a
(R 1)

During the course of the marriage, defendant
accumulated 21.6 years of civil service retirement
benefits and the plaintiff accumulated 2.6 years of
civil service retirement benefits.

(R 61)

The parties were divorced on November 6, 1985.
Among other things, the plaintiff waived any claim for
alimony.

(R 52)

She was also awarded one-half of

defendant's retirement, with the appropriate offset for
his share of her retirement based upon the formula set
forth in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (1982).
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(R 52)

The Decree of Divorce was signed

December 16 f 1985.

(R 56)

On December 28, 1985, the parties entered into a
Stipulation modifying the retirement portion of the
Decree of Divorce just referred to.

The parties agreed

the plaintiff would be awarded the specific sum of
$400.00 per month as her share of defendant's
retirement which was to begin in the month the
defendant retired and continue so long as he was
entitled to his retirement.

The Stipulation took into

account the retirement the plaintiff had accumulated in
her own right through civil service employment.

The

Order implementing the Stipulation was signed by the
Court on January 8, 1986.

(R 58-61)

Sometime in approximately August of 1990, the
plaintiff met with Ogden Attorney Paul T. Kunz because
the defendant had approached her and asked her if she
would consent to his taking a lump sum settlement of
his retirement benefits.

A proposed Stipulation for

Qualified Domestic Relations Order had been prepared by
defendant's attorney and she wanted Attorney Kunz to
review it and see whether it was in her interest to
sign the Stipulation.

(T 8-9)
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The Stipulation provided:
1. The plaintiff has left government
service early and has received a onetime payment of her retirement
contributions. Defendant by agreement
signed the release of said funds to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff in return
signed a waiver of any right she may
have against the lump sum of the
defendant's ctlternative annuity with
lump sum.
3. The retirement administrator will
not honor the written waiver of
plaintiff without a modification of
the divorce Decree.
4. The parties agree a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order may be issued
authorizing the plan administrator to
pay retirement as follows:
a. In the event defendant chooses
the alternative annuity with lump
sum payment, defendant shall
receive all of the lump sum.
b. Plaintiff shall receive onehalf of fifty-five percent of the
monthly retirement check due to
defendant each month.
c. In January of 1986, the monthly
amount was then calculated to be
$400.00 per month. This amount may
vary depending on the actual monthly
amount paid as determined at the
time of actual retirement.
5. This agreement is to supersede any
existing order and to become the
governing la.w between the parties.
6. The parties agree to execute such
documents as may be required to affect
their intent as expressed herein.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1)
- 6 -

In an effort to properly advise the plaintiff,
Mr. Kunz called retirement individuals at Hill Air
Force Base and subsequently called the Office of
Personnel Management in Washington, D.C. to obtain
additional information concerning alternatives
available to the plaintiff.

Based on the information

Mr. Kunz received, he came to the conclusion that both
parties either had to accept the lump sum benefit or
both parties had to accept the monthly benefit and that
one party could not pull out the lump sum and then the
secondary party receive monthly benefits.

It was also

his understanding that if the lump sum benefit was to
be accepted, there would be no further benefits.
(T 10-12)
Because of that information, defendant's attorney
prepared a new Stipulation wherein the plaintiff agreed
the defendant could apply for his lump sum distribution
and she would be entitled to receive $8,100.00 of that
lump sum payment as her share of the defendant's
retirement benefits.

Admittedly, the new Stipulation

provides:
Upon payment of the twenty-seven
percent of the lump sum totally
(sic) approximately $8,100.00,
no further sums shall be paid to
the plaintiff and any remaining
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rights or benefits shall be the
exclusive property of the
defendant. Plaintiff waives all
other rights, present and future
in the defendant's retirement,
including any annuity or regular
retirement benefits. (R 68-69)
Before signing the Stipulation, Mr. Kunz
explained to the plaintiff that:
It's my understanding that if you
go with a lump sum, neither one of
you will receive any monthly
payments, that they make you go
strictly one way or the other and
that we don't have any alternative.
(T 12)
According to Mr. Kunz, the plaintiff indicated
that:
Well, if that is the case, he had
consented for me to take out my lump
sum. I feel that I am sort of honor
bound to let him do it. (T 12-13)
Mr. Kunz further testified that had he known that
in addition to the lump sum payment benefit
Mr. Montgomery was applying for he would have also been
entitled to go on receiving monthly retirement
payments, he never would have agreed to sign the
Stipulation with the plaintiff.

It was clear to him

that the mathematics of an $8,100.00 lump sum
settlement versus $400.00 per month indefinitely was
not a good bargain if both were available.

- 8 -

(T 13)

During the trial, the defendant introduced
defendant's

Exhibit 1.

The second sheet of the

Exhibit is a document entitled Alternative Annuity
Election.

Option 2 of that form was signed by the

parties which indicated that the defendant was electing
to take an alternative annuity with lump sum payment
and the plaintiff was consenting to that alternative
annuity election.

Although the form does refer to a

monthly annuity in addition to the lump sum payment, no
annuity amount or other information was provided on
that form.

The third sheet of Exhibit 1, another

Alternative Annuity Election form, had all of the
blanks filled in and had been signed by the defendant
on March 14, 1991.
plaintiff.

This document was not signed by the

It revealed that had the defendant decided

to retire without making a request for a lump sum
payment, he would have received a regular monthly
annuity of $1,914.00.

By making the lump sum

alternative election, however, he received a lump sum
payment of $29,774.17 plus an on-going monthly annuity
of $1,776.00.
The plaintiff testified that when she signed the
second sheet of defendant's Exhibit 1 on
October 10, 1989, she did not know that in addition to
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the lump sum payment, the defendant would be receiving
an additional monthly annuity retirement benefit.

Had

she known that information, she would not have signed
an agreement waiving any monthly annuity.

(T 37)

At

the time the plaintiff signed the specific waiver, she
indicated that she asked for a copy of the
informational cover sheet, which was page 1 of
defendant's Exhibit 1, and she stated that:
The lady notary had it and was
going to copy it, and he ripped
it out of her hands. I don't
have anything and he would not
let me have it either. (T 31)
The fact that defendant was receiving a monthly
annuity in addition to the lump sum was brought to
light primarily because the plaintiff did not receive
her $8,100.00 lump sum share after the defendant
retired.

He had already received approximately

$17,000.00 of his lump sum benefits (T 17) and as of
the date of the hearing, the plaintiff had not received
anything.

(T 37)

At the conclusion of the trial, the Court entered
its findings and order, finding that the defendant
failed to convey to the plaintiff what the actual
entitlement was, that when she signed page 2 of
Exhibit 1 it was in blank and that left her with the
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understanding that the only benefit available would be
the lump sum payment for a total settlement and that
this lack of information constituted the
misrepresentation.

(T 48-51) and (R 110-116)

The

specific Finding provides:
10. At the time the plaintiff
signed defendant's Exhibit 1,
the defendant deliberately
misrepresented to the plaintiff
what the benefits were and never
conveyed to her what her actual
entitlement was or could be.
This misrepresentation caused
the plaintiff to enter into the
Stipulated dated November 2, 1990.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The plaintiff entered into a Stipulation based
upon misinformation.

The defendant did not provide all

relevant facts to her when he asked her to agree to
modify an earlier retirement Stipulation.

The trial

Court exercised its equitable power to modify the
Stipulation and restore the plaintiff to the position
she would have been in had the true facts been known.
The Order should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT CORRECTLY MODIFIED THE STIPULATION
WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ENTERED INTO BY THE
PARTIES REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S ENTITLEMENT TO
DEFENDANT'S RETIREMENT BENEFITS.
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The case of Gates v. Gates, 787 P.2d 1344 (Utah
App. 1990) is closely analogous to this case.
In Gates, the trial Court modified a Stipulation
increasing child support which had been entered into by
the parties.

The Court did so, acknowledging there had

been no material changes in circumstances, but justified
the modification because of Mr. Gates' failure to
disclose his true income.

The failure to disclose was

not really an express misrepresentation as much as it
was an omission of facts given to his ex-wife.
In Gates, as in this case, appellant contended
that it was error to modify a Stipulation absent a
change in circumstances; there was no actual
misrepresentation? and, since Mrs. Gates was
represented by counsel, she had a duty to ascertain the
true facts.
On appeal, the Court held that:
Since respondent did not have accurate
information about appellant's income
at the time she executed the
Stipulation, the trial Court did not
err in modifying its prior order
based on that Stipulation. A party
may not obtain a Stipulation based
on a misrepresentation or material
omission of facts and later claim
that a child support order cannot
be modified because there has been
no material change in circumstances
based on those same undisclosed or
misrepresented facts. at 1346
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The Gates case did seem to create some limitation
to this rule when it cited Myers v.Myers, 768 P.2d 979
(Utah App. 1989) holding that contract theories of
bargain and waiver can be applied to stipulations
involving property distribution, but not "to issues
which involve the continuing, equitable powers of the
Court, such as child custody and support".

at 1346.

That limitation, if it is one, should be inapplicable
to this case because we are dealing with a form of
support for Mrs. Snitchler.

When the Woodward formula

was created by the Supreme Court in 1982, they refered
to pension benefits as an "economic resource subject to
equitable distribution".
Alternatively, the Myers holding should be
narrowed to permit an additional exception to a case
such as this.

Even better would be to eliminate the

limitation altogether.

It makes little sense in cases

of equity to allow a person to profit from active or
passive misinformation knowingly relied upon by the
other party.
This had been a marriage of forty-one years.
During that time, Mr. Montgomery was able to accumulate
21.6 years of civil service retirement while Mrs.
Montgomery only accumulated 2.6 years.
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Her original

Stipulation entitlement of Mr. Montgomery's retirement
was to be $400.00 per month commencing at his
retirement.

This took into account her own civil

service retirement benefit amount.
Had Mr. Montgomery elected not to request a lump
sum payment, he would have received $1,914.00 per
month, less the $400.00 due Mrs. Montgomery.

By

electing the lump sum payment, his monthly annuity is
only reduced to $1,776.00 and he received $29,774.00
cash.

He wants to be forgiven of any further

obligation to his former wife by paying her $8,100.00
out of his cash settlement.

That result is not logical

or equitable.
Mr. Montgomery argues that he has radically
changed his position by retiring and he only did so in
reliance on the Stipulation signed by his ex-wife.

He

claims he would have continued to work had he known she
would attempt to back out of the Stipulation.
argument belies the facts.

His

The first Stipulation he

presented to her for signing provided that she would
receive one-half of fifty-five percent of his monthly
retirement check if she would waive any claim to the
lump sum distribution.

As it turns out, had she signed

that Stipulation, he would have received and kept
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$29,774.00 and she would have started receiving $488.40
per month ($1,776.00 x .55% x 1/2). This is what he
wanted in the first place.
would have retired.
more.

Had she signed it, he still

She is not asking for anything

She does not want any of his lump sum.

wants her monthly entitlement.

She just

She didn't sign that

Stipulation believing that if he elected the lump sum,
she could not get a monthly annuity.

Mr. Montgomery

was aware of, or should have been aware of, this
misunderstanding.

This omission of accurate

information has caused her to radically alter her
entitlement.

The Court's Order should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION

The trial Court has the right and equitable power
to modify a Stipulation entered into based upon
omissions of material facts.

The Court-ordered

modification should be affirmed.
DATED this \ \ —

day of June, 1992.

BRIAN R. FLORENCE
Attorney for
Plaintiff/Appellee
818-26th Street
Ogden, UT
84401
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee,
postage prepaid, to Donald C. Hughes, Attorney for
Defendant/Appellant, 298-24th Street #125, Ogden,
UT 84401, on this

day oivJune, 1992.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HILDE B. MONTGOMERY(SNITCHLER)
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 850737455
Hon. Douglas L. Cornaby

ROBERT G. MONTGOMERY,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for trial on the 8th
day of January, 1992, pursuant to plaintiff's Petition for
Modification, plaintiff present and represented by counsel,
Brian R. Florence, and defendant present and represented by
counsel, Donald C. Hughes, and the Court having been fully
advised in the premise, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The above-named parties were divorced on

November 6, 1985, at which time the plaintiff was "awarded
FLORENCE
and
[UTCHISON

one-half

of defendant's retirement, with the appropriate

offset for defendant's share of her retirement, based on the
fcOFESSIONAL
JRPORATION

formula set forth in Woodward".
2.

rTORNEYSAT
LAW

-26TH STREET
EN, UTAH 84401

The parties thereafter entered into a Stipulation

that after calculating the defendant's regular civil service

?\mm

MONTGOMERY (SNITCHLER) v. MONTGOMERY
Civil No. 850737455
Findings of Fact and Order
Page 2

years and deducting the plaintiff's civil service years, that
the plaintiff would be entitled to a monthly annuity in the
sum of $400.00 which would represent her full Woodward share
in the defendant's retirement benefits at such time as he
retired.
3.

A Qualified Domestic Relations Order was prepared

and submitted to the government retirement office awarding to
the plaintiff a $400.00 monthly benefit from the defendant's
retirement which would begin upon his retirement.
4.

In October of 1989, the plaintiff signed a form at

the defendant's request agreeing to permit him to obtain a
lump sum retirement payment.

This form was introduced as

part

1.

of

defendant's

Exhibit

There

were

no

other

attachments to the form signed by the plaintiff and there was
nothing on the form that would indicate to the plaintiff the
amount of annuity she would be receiving or that she was
waiving.
FLORENCE
and
TOTCHISON

5.

In the summer of 1990, the defendant asked the

plaintiff to sign a Stipulation wherein she would waive all
claims to his lump sum retirement payment in exchange for

ROFESSIONAL
:ORTORATION
kTTORNEYS AT
LAW

one-half

of

Stipulation

55% of
was

his monthly

marked

introduced into evidence.
8 - 26TH STREET
DEN, UTAH 84401

as

annuity

plaintiff's

benefit.
Exhibit

This
1

and

II
MONTGOMERY (SNITCHLER) v. MONTGOMERY
Civil No. 850737455
Findings of Fact and Order
Page 3

6. The plaintiff consulted with Attorney Paul Kunz and
was led to believe that a lump sum retirement benefit could
not be paid and additionally

preserve a monthly

annuity

plaintiff

into

retirement benefit.
7.

Thereafter,

the

entered

a

Stipulation with the defendant to receive 27% of his lump sum
retirement payment or the approximate amount of $8,100.00 in
lieu of the monthly annuity benefit she had earlier received
in connection with the divorce.

The plaintiff believed that

civil service regulations prohibited her or the defendant
from receiving a lump sum retirement benefit and monthly
annuity benefits.
8.

When it came time for the plaintiff to receive her

lump sum payment, she learned that the defendant had received
a portion of his lump sum payment and was also receiving a
monthly annuity benefit.
9.

As an additional part of defendant's Exhibit 1, it

is determined that had defendant not agreed to accept a lump
sum retirement benefit, his monthly annuity would have been
$1,914.00.

By electing to receive the lump sum benefit, his

monthly annuity benefit would be reduced to $1,776.00.

His

lump sum retirement benefit that he is entitled to receive is
$29,774.00.

AdQO^RO

MONTGOMERY (SNITCHLER) v. MONTGOMERY
Civil No. 850737455
Findings of Fact and Order
Page 4

10.

At the time the plaintiff

signed

defendant's

Exhibit 1, the defendant deliberately misrepresented to the
plaintiff what the benefits were and never conveyed to her
what

her

actual

entitlement

was

or

could

be.

This

misrepresentation caused the plaintiff to enter into the
Stipulation dated November 2, 1990.
11.

The defendant retired effective December 1, 1990

and has received approximately $17,000.00 of his lump sum
benefits and is also receiving $1,776.00 per month retirement
annuity benefits.

The plaintiff has received nothing to

date.
12.

The defendant

retired

earlier

than he might

otherwise have retired believing that the plaintiff would be
making no further claim on any future annuity rights and as
a result, his monthly benefit has been diminished some by
reason of his lump sum retirement election.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
FLORENCE
and
HUTCHISON

makes and files its:
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipulation entered into

PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION
ATTORNEYS AT
LAW

by the plaintiff on November 2, 1990 and the corresponding
QDRO that was issued as a result of that Stipulation is set
aside.

U8 - 26TH STREET
GDEN, UTAH 84401
/\ /» r\ c* r+t r* -*

MONTGOMERY (SNITCHLER) v. MONTGOMERY
Civil No. 850737455
Findings of Fact and Order
Page 5

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that under the circumstances of
defendant's early retirement and the misrepresentations that
have occurred, the plaintiff should not have the benefit of
both a part of defendant's lump sum retirement payment and
his lump sum annuity.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant is awarded all of
the lump sum retirement pursuant to his election.

Effective

with his retirement on December 1, 1990, the plaintiff is
entitled to 27% of each monthly annuity amount paid to the
defendant or owed to the defendant by the civil service
retirement office.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a new Qualified Domestic
Relations

Order

should

be issued

to the civil

service

retirement office directing them to forthwith pay to the
plaintiff

27% of the defendant's monthly annuity benefit

effective immediately and that all prior orders and elections
previously received by them are deemed rescinded and void.
FLORENCE
and
HUTCHISON

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that until the civil service
retirement

office

begins

sending

the

plaintiff

her

proportionate retirement share, the defendant is directed to
PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION
ATTORNEYS AT
LAW

begin paying her effective with the month of January, 1991,
the sum of $400.00 per month towards this amount.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as soon as it is calculated

18 - 26TH STREET
rDEN, UTAH 84401

MONTGOMERY (SNITCHLER) v. MONTGOMERY
Civil No. 850737455
Findings of Fact and Order
Page 6

as to how much the defendant has received for the months from
and including December,, 1990 through December, 1991, and any
difference between the amount that the plaintiff is actually
entitled to and the $400.00 that the defendant pays her
beginning with January, 1991, until the plaintiff

starts

receiving retirement benefits directly, shall be owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff.

As soon as that specific amount

is determined, the defendant should make arrangements to pay
the plaintiff that amount.
DATED this

^^

day of February, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

vrU.
CL. CORNABY, Judge

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT
TO DEFENDANT ABOVE-NAMED AND HIS COUNSEL:
Pursuant
FLORENCE
and
[UTCHISON

to

Rule

4-504

of

the Code

of

Judicial

Administration, you are hereby notified that the undersigned
will hold the original hereof for a period of five days from

ROFESSIONAL
ORPORATION

the date this notice is mailed to you to allow you sufficient
time to file any written objections to the form of the

TTORNEYS AT
LAW

1-26TH STREET
)EN, UTAH 84401

foregoing with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned.
If no objections to the form are filed within that time, the

MONTGOMERY (SNITCHLER) v. MONTGOMERY
Civil No. 850737455
Findings of Fact and Order
Page 7

original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature
and filing.
DATED this

/
/(J

day of February, 1992.
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON

Attorney for Plaintiff
818-26th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Order, postage prepaid,
to Donald C. Hughes, Attorney for defendant, 520-26th Street
#206, Ogden, UT 84401, on this JO

day of February, 1992.

EIL-EEN CHR'ISTE'NSEN
Secretary

LORENCE
and
OTCHISON
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RPORATION
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LAW

26TH STREET
•N, UTAH 84401

FILED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JUN 2 6 1992
0 F

HILDE B. MONTGOMERY
(SNITCHLER),
Plaintiff/Appellee,

APPEALS

Case No. 920138-CA

vs.

Priority 16

ROBERT G. MONTGOMERY,
Defendant/Appellant.

SUPPLEMENT TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE

DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
There are no Constitutions, Statutes, Ordinances, Rules
or Regulations whose interpretation is determinative of this
case.
DATED this "~H'l

day of June, 1992.
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON

3RIAN R. FLORENCE
Attorney for
Plaintiff/Appellee
818-26th Street
Ogden, Utah
84401
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and
correct copies of the foregoing Supplement to Brief of Appellee,
postage prepaid, to Donald C. Hughes, Attorney for
Defendant/Appellant, 298-24th Street #125, Ogden,
UT 84401, on this gX^VL-day of June, 1992.

BRIAN R. FLORENCE
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